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Recently, there has been much public debate on the deterioration of the EU-Turkish relationship 
in terms of accession prospects for Turkey, many often blaming the democratic backsliding 
within the country for the declining likelihood of accession. Enlargement literature generally 
treats Turkey as a sui generis case for reasons such as geographic location and religious 
background. This paper, however, considers Turkey a sui generis case for a different reason: it is 
the only candidate country so far to transition away from, rather than towards, democracy. The 
main aim of this paper is to address whether the deterioration of the prospects of Turkish 
accession to the EU has been more the result of Turkish or EU actions. By analyzing the 
development of Turkish accession through changes over time of indicators of democratic 
backsliding and economic interdependence between Turkey and the EU, the paper shows which 
actor has caused the pulling back of relations in a given time period. This study aims to fill a gap 
in enlargement theory by analyzing a factor traditionally overlooked, regime change. Preliminary 
empirical observations show that, as Turkey progressed from asymmetric to symmetric economic 
interdependence with the EU, accession conditions began to delay until the halt we witness 
today. The analysis demonstrates that, with Turkey sliding towards illiberal democracy and 
progressing independently as a growing economic power, the EU has lost the leverage it once 
had over Turkey. This outcome allows some predictions on the future of the EU-Turkish 
relationship and the possible paths it may continue upon. 
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 When determining the success of the European Union (EU), many point to enlargement 
as a key example of how the EU has fostered cooperation and spread peace across the continent. 
They give the European Union credit as a normative power diffusing values of democracy, 
respect of human rights, and free market economies to member and potential member states 
alike1. As the European Union has grown, it has widened (increased the number of member 
states) and deepened (increased its competences) thus making it more challenging institutionally 
to make decisions. In particular, enlargement which requires unanimous voting across member 
states is extremely difficult and many scholars theorize that “enlargement fatigue” has occurred 
and predict the EU has possibly reached its cap in membership2. As more EU members have 
joined and struggled with implementation of EU law after admittance in particular Eastern 
European countries, it has led to a growing field of criticism against EU enlargement. Some 
critics have suggested that EU candidate status has produced political consolidation in candidate 
countries while trying to complete the acquis communautaire leading to a frustration among 
citizens, further widening of the democratic deficit, and rise of populist parties and technocracy3.
 Turkey has always proven to be the most controversial candidate country of the European 
Union. First admitted as a candidate in 1999, Turkey has closed more chapters than other 
candidate countries totaling 164. However, Turkey has become a unique EU candidate as it is 
now in danger of potentially having to stall or halt accession entirely. Since the reign of 
President Erdogan, public support of EU membership has declined5. In the past, the EU was able 
to use a carrot and stick approach by incentivizing Turkey to cooperate by soliciting the potential 
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of future EU membership. Recently, the EU has continuously postponed the accession progress 
of Turkey and the carrots it can offer have declined as well as the perceived benefits of 
membership6. Today accession has come to a boiling point as certain EU officials have 
demanded all accession funds be cut due to concerns of human rights violations within Turkey 
after the coup attempt of 2016.  
 There is large debate on what effect being an EU member has had on the evolution of 
Turkish politics. Supporters of Turkish accession believe that being an EU member has caused 
Turkey to pursue more liberal democratic policies than it would have on its own due to the desire 
to join the EU such as removing the death penalty7. On the contrary, others have argued that the 
EU had little influence on the progression of Turkey suggesting that the “Europeanization” of 
Turkey’s was a strategic decision by the AKP party, rather than a result of wanting to become an 
EU member8. This implies that Turkey would have evolved in the same way it has today had it 
never been an EU candidate country. This paper aims to put these two phenomena of decline of 
the EU-Turkish accession relationship and the impact of the EU on Turkish policy creation to 
determine which actor, the EU or Turkey, is more to blame for the deteriorative relationship.    
 The paper is organized in the following order. It begins by introducing existing literature 
on EU enlargement and what factors lead to accession. We then discuss why Turkey is treated as 
a sui generis case and excluded from enlargement literature. Through our methods and 
application section, we demonstrate what independent variables we will be testing and state our 
hypothesis on the evolution of Turkish EU accession. The analysis section will exhibit through a 
historical timeline and emphasis on moments of critical juncture how the relationship has 
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evolved and categorize each time period by whether accession progress (or lack thereof) 
occurred. The conclusion will elaborate on the implications of this study and evaluate the 
validity of the hypothesis. In addition, the conclusion will explore the limitations in this study, 
where it could further develop, and our predictions on the future of the EU-Turkey relationship.  
Literature Review 
 This section will compare existing literature on whether the EU or Turkey has been the 
greater culprit in the deterioration of Turkish accession to the EU. We will analyze the theories 
of EU enlargement and how the EU engages with national actors to push for EU accession. Then 
we will analyze why Turkey has often been excluded from enlargement rhetoric and considered 
as a sui generis case where the theory does not apply. This paper will argue for different reasons 
why Turkey is a sui generis case for EU enlargement and what factors make it an unprecedented 
EU candidate country.  
European Union Enlargement Theories  
Why is EU membership attractive?  
 Joining the European Union is not an easy task. Before the long and slow process of 
opening and closing chapters of the EU acquis communautaire, countries first must meet the 
criteria to even be considered an EU candidate. EU candidacy is determined by the 1993 
Copenhagen criteria which requires that countries have institutions that guarantee political values 
aligned with the EU (democracy, respect of human rights and minorities, and rule of law), liberal 
economic principles (free and open market economy that is capable and promotes competition), 
and the aptitude to meet commitments and duties of being an EU member9. So why do countries 
want to subject themselves to these huge reforms and endless legislation of the EU? Countries 
want to join the EU both because of the perceived benefits and for fear of exclusion.  
                                                 





 EU membership grants countries benefits in three specific areas: prosperity, security, and 
aid in reinforcing democracy. From the prosperity perspective, many countries that have joined 
the EU including recent additions of Romania and Bulgaria doubled their GDP in a little over a 
decade after joining the EU10. In terms of security, though the EU is still lacking in terms of 
foreign policy in comparison to its economic competencies, it still offers advantages such as a 
naval forces to aid in migration in FRONTEX, a united foreign policy with delegations around 
the world in the European External Action Services, and police coordination across borders 
through Europol.  Lastly, being an EU member not only helps countries become democracies, 
but helps instill and enforce that democracy remains protected once a member. Non-EU 
members take the enormous task of transforming their countries in order to become a member 
state in order to reap the economic, defensive, and democratic benefits of EU membership.  
 On the other side, countries want to join the European Union for fear of the repercussions 
of exclusion. In economic terms, countries that do not join the European Union will be subject to 
much higher financial costs to import goods and services into EU countries unless they are part 
of a negotiated agreement between the EU and a third country such as free trade agreement and 
customs unions. In terms of security countries that do not join the EU can be more likely 
pressured by other world powers such as Russia and China and thus will be enticed to have the 
protection of the EU against coercive world powers. On the regional level, the cost of exclusion 
to the EU means that countries will watch their neighbors that are granted EU membership rise 
while they lag behind in benchmarks such as GDP growth. On the world stage, countries that do 
not join the EU will see things such as foreign direct investment (FDI), development aid, and 
trade diverted away and instead directed to EU member states due to outside actors favoring the 
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accountability and stability of the EU over a single less powerful country11. Thus, the desire for 
EU membership and the large hurdle to become a member is pursued by countries for the 
perceived benefits as well as out of fear for marginalization and impediment of growth if they do 
not join the EU.  
How do candidate countries match the EU acquis communautaire? 
 Once EU candidate countries overcome the large obstacle of meeting the Copenhagen 
criteria, they must match the EU acquis communautaire, meaning all EU existing laws, so that 
national legislation reflects EU legislation. How is this done? The European Union acts as the 
pull factor that pulls candidate countries and their prospective institutions in the direction of 
matching the acquis communautaire. There are two dominant theories of how the European 
Union utilizes this pull factor. First, rational choice institutionalism focuses on the fact that 
actions are taken by domestic actors in response to EU incentives as a result of cost/benefit 
analysis12. Specifically the European Union uses an external incentives model (EIM) to 
encourage democratization of candidate countries through conditionality by rewarding matching 
the acquis communautaire with opening more chapters and punishing defections by delaying 
opening additional chapters or imposition of sanctions13. It must be clear that sanctions are not 
issued lightly by the EU and are not issued due to slow or gradual reforms to meet acquis 
communautaire, but rather are issued only in severe cases such as democratic backsliding14. The 
EIM model is the main pull factor where through cost/benefit analysis, the EU increases the 
benefits over the costs so that they pull countries into matching acquis communautaire. 
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Alternatively, sociological institutionalism explains that EU candidate countries adapt by the rise 
of norms and customs that align with EU values into domestic institutions15. The EU often 
combines strategies of both theories in incentivizing member countries to match EU acquis.  
 Through reformation of political institutions and pressure from domestic actors, 
candidates are pushed towards pursuing actions to meet the EU acquis. Through cost/benefit 
analysis, domestic actors see opportunity of EU incentives and create reform coalitions with 
different political groups who support EU membership to enact policy to meet the EU acquis 
communautaire 16. Through the practice of norms and using identity of “Europe”, norm 
entrepreneurs and epistemic communities advocate for EU membership by promoting values of 
EU such as protection of minorities, value of human rights, and democracy. Often the EU is 
likely to find an ally in groups that have been highly marginalized in the past by older 
institutions of member states and thus will likely to advocate for new norms of inclusion and 
cohesion. Additional domestic factors that explains variation in success of adhering to EU acquis 
are: power asymmetries, domestic incentives for change, and degrees of statehood17. Power 
asymmetries represent that countries that are more dependent on EU are more likely to adopt EU 
acquis communautaire at a more rapid pace, whereas countries that possess resources the EU 
does not, such as minerals, may be slower and have fewer incentives to push to match the acquis 
communautaire. Domestic incentives for change includes what national actors expect to gain 
from EU membership, including non-liberal actors that do not share EU values. Even national 
opposition to EU membership benefit by locking in institutional changes while their states 
matches EU acquis18. Statehood represents how well a country can draft EU compatible law and 
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implement it at both the national and local level. Thus the pull of the EU, in benefits and norms, 
is important but works best when accompanied by a strong push from domestic actors.  
Exception to the rules: Turkey 
 Many existing theories on EU enlargement exclude Turkey as the “exception” to the rule 
that cannot be analyzed in their theory and data. Turkey is excluded due to regional factors19 (the 
questioning of whether Turkey should even be considered as part of Europe) and cultural 
factors20 (questioning of a predominately Muslim demographic as just cause for exclusion). This 
logic of excluding Turkey from enlargement theories is inherently flawed. This study proposes 
that Turkey is excluded from EU enlargement theory because enlargement theory focuses on 
democratization of countries and the EU having a fundamental role in this transition. Many of 
the theories we presented stem from analysis after the enlargement of 2004 of countries from 
communist to democratic states. On the contrary, Turkey has been a democracy since the 
founding of the Republic after WWI in 1923. Thus, Turkey is a unique case in enlargement 
theories not because of its cultural or geographical nature, but because it is the only EU 
candidate country that has been a democracy long before accession talks ever began or rather the 
EU even existed. However, the Turkey of the past decade has involved numerous reforms that 
have caused Turkey to backslide into an illiberal democracy.  
Turkey as a “special” European case 
 Turkey is different than other Muslim countries, other MENA countries, and EU member 
states because it has a consolidated democracy. According to Samuel Huntington, democracy 
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must be consolidated twice in order for a democracy to show stability21. In 1993 Bernard Lewis 
argued that Turkey had been the only Muslim country to successfully solidify its democracy 
twice over22. We can analyze four main factors that have separated Turkey from other countries: 
first Turkey has never been subject to imperial rule or colonized by another world power, second 
due to location and strategic decision Turkey has always had a close relationship with the West 
and emulated democracy from a very early stage, third the founding of the Turkish Republic as 
secular was fundamentally different than its neighbors at the time of its founding and lastly 
Turkey has always had a large presence of civil society through its creation of a middle class 
during the economic changes under Ataturk23. Why do all of these factors matter and how were 
they able to be successfully consolidated? Turkey successfully created a democracy by doing it 
gradually and by opting into it, rather than it being imposed upon by outside forces. EU 
enlargement theory largely focuses on democratization that has been forced upon a country or 
helped built by an existing democracy. Turkey after WWI, voluntarily restructured itself into a 
democracy without the imposition of third actors. All of these factors and the historical legacy of 
Turkey are important factors to consider for our case in determining why Turkey has pursued 
certain policies relating to accession and how the EU has responded.  
Illiberal vs. Liberal Democracy?  
 Now that we have distinguished Turkey from most EU candidate countries as most 
candidates transition to democracy whereas Turkey today is transitioning away from democracy, 
we must define what an illiberal democracy is. According to Fareed Zakaria, illiberal 
democracies are democratic governments that bypass means of checks and balances, lessen the 
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power of judiciary, and transfer power from the regional to the national level in order to have 
consolidated controlling power24. The key difference Zakaria makes is that democracies are on 
the rise, but there has been an naïve assumption of constitutional liberalism as the only type of 
democracy. Constitutional liberalism is what many think of when referring to western 
democracies including things like freedom of speech, universal suffrage, secularism, and 
separation of powers25. However, countries can be democratic and have these inherent civil 
liberties missing or rather ignored through a powerful executive. It is clear that the EU only 
wants to admit candidate countries that fall under the constitutional liberal frame; however, it is 
often a challenging and time consuming task for countries to adapt from autocratic governments 
to constitutional liberal democracies. This can be seen through the fact that many Eastern Europe 
countries are “hybrid” democracies in that they have the institutions established to support a 
constitutional liberal democracy, but often leaders still show signs of their autocratic past. 
 Turkey is a sui generis EU candidate country. Not because of its geographic location or 
demographic makeup, but because it is an established democracy that is now backsliding toward 
an illiberal democracy. Through our methods and analysis section, we will analyze how Turkey 
has transitioned from a constitutional liberal democracy to illiberal democracy especially in the 
last decade under the rule of President Erdogan.  
Methods and Application  
 This paper aims to fulfill a hole in the enlargement theory, through the case study of 
Turkey, by including the additional factor of type of democracy into analyzing the evolution of 
accession. Tree characteristics must be present to optimize candidate countries incentives to join 
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the EU: asymmetric interdependence, enforcement, and meritocracy26.  The first factor implies 
that the EU has more power to get candidate countries to match the acquis communautaire when 
the candidate has more to gain from EU membership than the EU does from their membership to 
the EU. The second factors centers on the idea that the EU must be able to enforce what they 
write in annual reports on candidate countries by only opening and closing chapters once all 
factors match the acquis communautaire and staying firm in their delays if defections. The last 
factor of meritocracy signifies that an EU candidate country must believe that EU does not hold 
an unfair grudges against their submission as a member and this factor is especially important to 
Turkey as meritocracy has been higher for this candidate than most27.  
  We have identified two variables that can help explain the deterioration of the EU 
Turkish relationship: level of economic interdependence and democracy. This paper measures 
economic interdependence because Turkey is the EU's 4th largest export market and 5th largest 
provider of imports and the EU is by Turkey's number one import and export partner28. By using 
indicators such as GDP per capita and levels of import and export between EU and Turkey 
compared to other trade powers, we will analyze the evolution of economic interdependence 
between the EU and Turkey. Secondly, we will analyze the level of democracy of the candidate 
country, Turkey, as another variable to fill the hole of regime type in the enlargement literature 
by using Freedom House scores. This paper will expand on moments of meritocracy in Turkish 
accession, but not measure it directly in the hypothesis. By combining these two variables, this 
paper aims to fill a gap in the hole of EU enlargement studies and how accession can deteriorate. 
 Turkey  
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 Liberal Democracy Illiberal Democracy 
Symmetric interdependence Delay Halt 
Asymmetric interdependence Progress  Delay  
 
 Before we can begin to apply predicted outcomes to our study of Turkey, we must define 
what progress, delay, and halt in terms of accession means. Below we offer some signals we 
anticipate29 to find in the data collection of accession conditions that will act as indicators as to 
whether progress or stalling has occurred during the EU-Turkish accession.   
Accession Conditions  
Progress Delay  Halt  
 Opening new chapters  
 Closing already opened 
chapters  
 
 EU member states blocking 
chapters from closing  
 Perception of lack of 
democracy in Turkey  
 
 EU stopping all accession 
funds being sent to 
candidate country 
 Candidate country 
leadership declaring 
intention to not join EU 
Based off initial research, we hypothesize the following:  
 The higher the level of asymmetric interdependence and the more liberal democracy, the 
more likely for accession to progress    
 
 The higher level of symmetric interdependence and the more illiberal democracy, more 
likely that accession will be delayed or halted entirely   
Analysis section 
 The EU-Turkey relationship and evolution of accession is a long and complicated 
phenomenon. For this purpose of this study, we will begin our analysis in 1999, the year Turkey 
officially became an EU candidate country and the year Freedom House scores began. Prior to 
candidacy, it is important to note that Turkey and the EU created a Customs Union in 1995 
                                                 





creating a high level of asymmetric economic interdependence30. Our study has divided 1999 to 
the present into subcategories based mainly on factors including changes in Freedom House 
scores, change of ruling political parties in Turkey, and EU internal decisions.  
Evolution of Turkish EU Accession 
Time frame Democratic conditions Economic interdependence Accession conditions 
1999-2002 4.5 Asymmetric Delay 
2002-2005 ↑ trend 
3.5 
Asymmetric Progress 
2005-2010 ↑ trend 
3 
Asymmetric Delay 
2010-2012 ↓ trend 
3 
AsymmetricSymmetric Delay 
2012-2016 ↓ trend 
3.5 
AsymmetricSymmetric Progressdelayprogress 
2016-present ↓ trend 
4.5 
Symmetric Delay halt 
 
1999-2002: Turkey focuses on domestic affairs and little progress on EU accession  
 The first period we will analyze can be characterized as liberal democracy and 
asymmetric interdependence, but a Turkish government that was too distracted by domestic 
issues to really push for EU enlargement. Turkey from 1999-2002 was controlled by a coalition 
government made up of the social- democratic Democratic Left (DSP),  right of center 
Motherland (ANAP), and the far right National Action Party (MHP)31. These three parties 
worked together to accomplish economic goals, but resisted creating reforms that would have 
fallen under the Copenhagen Criteria for enlargement. Frustrated by the lack of progress by 
during this period, Turkey had a Freedom House score of 4.5, with one being the best and seven 
being the worst and was labeled as “partially free”32. Since the Freedom House scores began in 
1999, there is no comparison to what score Turkey would have received prior to being an official 
EU candidate. Turkey’s Freedom House Score was on the poorer side and and remained stagnant 
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from 1999-2001 because of the challenges the coalition government faced including the 2001 
February financial crisis and Kurdish population challenges in Northern Iraq33. During this 
period, Turkey was able to raise their GDP per capita by $600 and saw an average growth rate of 
2% in GDP per capita34. Especially in the period from 1999-2000, GDP per capita grew by 10% 
in one year showing commitment of EU to meet the Copenhagen criteria in its first year as a 
candidate country35. However this enthusiasm, did not last long as 2002 saw a GDP per capita 
decrease of -4% after the 2001 financial crisis which required an IMF bailout to save the Turkish 
banks36. Thus, we would classify this time period as delayed accession due to initial enthusiasm 
for meeting economic requirements of the EU, but internal turmoil of the Kurds and financial 
problems caused the government led by an unstable coalition to focus on internal matters rather 
than on pushing for the EU to begin accession negotiations.  
2002-2005: AKP pushes for change and is rewarded with accession negotiations   
 In 2002, the golden age of Turkish EU enlargement began with the electoral win of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) led under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The party not only won 
the national elections, but dominated winning almost 2/3rd majority of parliamentary seats37. The 
2002 parliamentary elections were historic because the secularist military allowed the Islamist 
AKP political party to win without intervention, unlike multiple other elections since 1960 where 
the military intervened to stop the rise of Islamic political parties. Since the electoral win, 
Erdogan aggressively pushed for reforms as to increase Turkey’s standing and gain a definitive 
start date on when chapters could be opened for accession. His efforts included legislation in the 
summer of 2003 to remove broadcasting and teaching bans of Kurdish programming, reducing 
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the formal power of the Turkish military, and a law banning torture and these efforts were 
followed by constitutional reforms in 2004 that revised the penal code38. In addition, the Cyprus 
dispute found a resolution under the Annual Plan for Cyprus led by the United Nations and the 
Turkish Cypriots cooperation was also good signal to the EU of Turkey’s commitment to 
accession39. We can clearly see the improvement in addition with the upward trend of Freedom 
house score going from a 4.5 to 3.540 the year after AKP came to power. In addition, after the 
reforms of 2003 and constitutional reforms of 2004, the civil liberties rating, a subcategory under 
Freedom House scores, went from a 4 to 341 thanks to inclusion of Kurdish culture in Turkish 
legislation.  
 EU internal meritocracy was present in the early 2002 when former French President 
Valery Giscard d'Estaing42 declared Turkish accession would destroy the European Union. In a 
2003 report, the EU commended Turkey for its progress, but said additional reforms were needed 
before negotiations could begin. The following year, the EU showed solidarity with Turkey 
when the Kurdish separatist group, the PKK, was added to the EU terrorism watch list. This 
solidarity was evident in Europe’s own past of secessionist terrorist groups including the IRA of 
Ireland and ETA of Spain. In 2005, Turkey’s hard work finally paid off when the Commission 
rewarded Turkish efforts with the opening of accession negotiations.  
 Erdogan’s commitment to pushing for EU backed reforms in order to get the EU to begin 
opening chapters is also evident by the large increase in economic performance of Turkey in this 
time period. From 2005-2002, Turkey’s GDP per capita grew by $2565 with an average growth 
of 7% and from 2003 to 2004, GDP per capita grew by 13% in one year and 10% the following 
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year as well43. In addition, in terms of imports and exports to and from Turkey the economic 
interdependence between the countries grew exponentially in this short time frame. From 2002-
2005, Turkish exports send to the EU grew by 26% and 25% two years in a row as well as EU 
imports into Turkey increasing an average of 28% in this period44. The interdependence was still 
asymmetric in that the European Union was Turkey’s largest market to export goods, whereas 
Turkey was the 5th largest market for EU goods behind the USA, MEA region, followed by 
China and Russia. Thus the beginning years of the AKP party can be categorized as a 
commitment to get the European Union to begin accession discussions by improving the liberal 
democratic aspects of the government and making the economy more open and connected to the 
European Union.  
2005-2010: Accession begin  
 Entering 2005, all signs showed to positive progression for Turkey opening and closing 
chapters if Turkey under the AKP party continued to pursue its rapid pace of change; however, 
things did not go as planned. 2005 began with the screening process where the EU determines 
which laws must be changed to match the acquis communautaire. Since chapter discussions have 
begun, of the 35 total chapters, Turkey has opened 16 chapters, but only successfully closed one 
chapter (Science & Research)45. What has been the blockade? The European Union naively 
believing that the Cyprus dispute had been settled with the Annual Plan for Cyprus, allowed 
Cyprus to join the EU in 2004. In reality the Cyprus dispute was not settled at all46. In 2006, due 
to lack of progress in finding a solution, the European Union decided to freeze discussions on all 
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8 open chapters47 and stated that no chapters will close until Cyprus and Turkey can find a long 
term solution. The blockades on opening new chapters continued in 2010 by efforts led by 
France and Cyprus.  
 From 2005 to 2012, Turkey was able to maintain its highest Freedom House score, a “3” 
by stably maintaining new civil liberties and political rights in Turkish legislation48. The increase 
from rating 3.5 in 2004 to 3 in 2005 can be accounted for by the fact that constitutional reforms 
of 2004 were taken into account for the score of 2005 as they are evaluated at the conclusion of 
the year. Specifically, Turkey made great gains by going from a 4 to 3 in the civil liberties 
rating49 thanks to inclusion of Kurdish rights into national legislation. However, 2005 and 2006 
witnessed the beginning of domestic challenges in Turkey including increased PKK violence 
after the end of its long ceasefire and slowdown in reforms50. Turkey had an election in 2007 
where focus shifted from appealing to pro EU voters instead to AKP’s religious voters who 
opposed many of the 2004 reforms that got Turkey to open chapters in the first place. Despite 
this, the 2007 elections were deemed fair as more opposition parties including secularist and pro-
Kurdish parties won parliamentary seats51. The following year voting transferred to a referendum 
on constitutional amendments that extended the power of the executive within Turkey.  
 The period following 2009 is where we begin to notice downward trends arrow given to 
Turkey from Freedom House as a result of illiberal actions. 2009 was the first year to receive a 
downward trend as a result of protests following the banning of pro-Kurdish party DTP52. 2010 
was made up of the approval of constitutional changes that centered on reducing power of 
military courts, reorganization of the judiciary, and persecution of leaders of the 1980 coup by a 
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higher margin of 58%53. For a third term, AKP dominated parliamentary elections in June 2011. 
Throughout this period, trials against military officers attached to an attempted 2003 coup 
against the AKP party caused declining arrows for suppression of political opponents. In 2011 
these trials led to a mass resignation of many officers, allowing Erdogan to replace AKP skeptics 
in the military with new officers more friendly towards his rule. Thus, in terms of democracy we 
can characterize the period of 2005-2012 as an initial increase in democracy and civil rights 
followed by a slowdown of reforms beginning in 2009 and a slow progression of the AKP party 
to restructure Turkey into a more Islamic state and replace political opponents in the government 
through constitutional referendums and trials. Thus, Freedom House Scores remain stagnant 
from 2005 to 2012, but the first downward trend symbolizes a warning of the future decline in 
scores that were soon to come.  
 In terms of economic interdependence, this period saw the initial increase of cooperation 
between the EU and Turkey, followed by a halt as a result of the economic crisis in 2008. 
Despite the economic crisis, from 2005-2012 Turkey was still able to increase their GDP per 
capita by an average 12% percentage, high compared to the average 4% the EU grew GDP per 
capita54. From 2005-2008, imports and exports between the EU and Turkey continued to grow, 
but favoring the EU as EU imports into Turkey grew at a more rapid pace than Turkish exports 
into the EU did55. 2008 was the first decline in interdependence since Turkey became a candidate 
country. Following the typical asymmetric interdependence, Turkey was hurt more by the crisis 
than the EU witnessing a -26% decline in Turkish exports to the EU compared to a -22% 
decrease in EU exports to Turkey in 200956. However, the crisis only seemed to be a hiccup in 
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the relationship as trade between the countries and their GDP per capita seemed resilient and to 
bounce back rather quickly. In 2010 and 2011, GDP per capita in Turkey grew by 13% year over 
year two years in a row, adding to the popularity of Erdogan and his electoral victory in 201157. 
Turkish exports in particular bounced back from the crisis and an increased percentage of exports 
began to be sent to China in particular58. Thus the relationship remained asymmetric, but we 
begin to see the first signs of Turkey turning to other powers over the European Union for trade 
at the same time that illiberal democratic actions begin to occur within Turkey.  
2010-2012: Period of delay  
 From 2010 to 2012, not a single new chapters was opened in Turkey’s accession to the 
EU which led to an attempt to revive the relationship through the Positive Agenda59. In recent 
years, especially after the termination of the Western European Union (WEU) in 2011. The 
WEU was a military alliance between EU member states and partner countries that was replaced 
in 2011 after the Treaty of Lisbon was implemented. Thus in 2011, Turkey lost a voice in 
participating in European military policy outside of NATO and felt betrayed due to their higher 
commitment to Europe both within NATO and WEU60. In the Positive Agenda meetings were 
held in Turkey in 2012 where Turkish and EU leaders came together to create benchmarks to 
allow for closing of EU chapters. Part of the desire for the revival was the sense of pro—EU 
sentiment in Turkey declining through the rise of the less secular AKP party under Erdogan. 
However, this renewed cooperation was put on hold from July to December 2012 under the 
rotating presidency of the Council under Cyprus.  
2012-2016: Illiberal democracy begins and Turkey looks for other trade partners   
                                                 
57 See Table 2 
58 See Table 4 
59 Amanda Paul, “Turkey-EU Relations: Forever Engaged, Never to be Married?,” Heinrich Boll Stiftung European Union 8, July 
2015. 






 Turkey began their first decline in Freedom House scores in 2012 against civil liberties 
following court verdicts. The court verdicts were against military officers against supposed coup 
attempts and Kurdish activists, causing civil liberties score to drop from a 3 to 461. The following 
year did not include an actual drop in score, but did receive a downward trend following the Gezi 
Protests in 2013. These protests began in Istanbul against the creation of Gezi Park, but soon 
spread to the entire country and took on the nature of anti-government and dissatisfaction with 
the illiberal ruling of Erdogan. The government responded through police brutality in order to 
clear the crowds throughout the country. The Gezi protests as the first true social resistance 
experienced in Turkey since becoming an EU candidate country, saw automatic delaying of 
accession when the Commission postponed opening of Chapter 22 for fear of Turkey shifting 
more and more towards an illiberal democracy62. The importance of Gezi Protests according to 
Saatçioğlu is that the level of democracy within Turkey will determine the future of Turkish 
accession and that the Gezi Park protests and EU backlash is a clear example of this retaliation 
from the EU against defections in accession. This coincides with our theory and the first variable 
that increase in illiberal democratic tendencies will be punished through delaying or halting of 
accession.  
 2014 was also followed by another declining trend arrow in response to the corruption 
charges against AKP and Erdogan in 2013, which did not prevent him from winning the 
inaugural president post. Erdogan followed this political win through purges of business leaders, 
journalists, and religious minorities by accusing them of engineering this 2013 corruption 
scandal.  As a result of the Gezi Protests and purges, in October 2014 the European Commission 
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submitted its annual accession report that was more critical than ever before expressing concerns 
in Turkey against democratic values63. Despite EU concerns, these purges continued in 2015 
leading to a 3rd consecutive downward trend arrow especially against political opposition ahead 
of parliamentary elections in November to allow Erdogan to press forward with the revised 
executive system through a constitutional referendum. The European Union did not retract and 
decide to give up on Turkey during this period, but rather reinvigorated the relationship through 
the EU-Turkey summit in November 2015 where the EU decided to use the migration crisis and 
the help they need from Turkey as leverage for EU accession. This summit involved the original 
idea of the EU-Turkey deal allowing EU to return migrants to Turkey by promising future visa 
liberalization for Turkish citizens to Schengen zone and progression on accession64. 
  In terms of economic interdependence, the period 2012-2016 witnessed the rise of 
Turkey towards more economic symmetric dependence with the European Union. From 2012 to 
2016, Turkey overall saw an average -4% decrease in imports into Turkey worldwide65. 
Specifically after 2014, the amount of EU imports sent to Turkey drastically reduced while 
Turkish exports entering the EU stayed relatively stable. Thus, we can see the beginning signs of 
asymmetric interdependence fading as the balance between import and export between the EU 
and Turkey begins to favor Turkey on a more equal playing field with the EU. Why is this 
significant? According to our hypothesis then, this will likely reduce EU’s leverage on Turkey as 
the perceived benefits of EU membership will decline as the candidate country becomes more 
economically self-sufficient. In addition to trading of goods, this period began to see the 
increased trading of services and FDI as over half of FDI going into Turkey came from the EU66. 
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The EU Turkey summit resulting in 2016 in the EU-Turkey deal to curb migration awarded 
Turkey €3 billion in aid from the EU. Again, this shows the growing interdependence between 
the EU and Turkey shifting from asymmetric towards symmetric interdependence. The EU 
rewarded Turkey by progressing with accession for the EU-Turkey deal by thawing previously 
frozen chapters.  
2016-Present: Past the Point of No Return  
 The past two years have proven to be the most illiberal of Turkey as Turkey has regressed 
from “partly free” to “not free” making it the largest decline by a single country in the past 
decade according to Freedom House scores. 2016 witnessed the largest drop in Freedom House 
scores dropping a whole point from 3.5 to 4.5, the levels Turkey once was in 1999, after the 2016 
coup attempt and the government’s crackdown as a response67. In the beginning of 2016 in an 
effort to silence Gülenist influence, the government closed Gülenist newspapers, television 
stations, and seized companies; thus, the July coup was an attempt to overthrow the government 
before the annual rotation in August of senior officials in the military and government before 
Erdogan could replace Gülenist supporters68. The attempted coup of July 2016 was a tragic event 
that left 260 people dead in Turkey69. Erdogan’s government was quick to punish those who 
initiated the coup resulting in 58,000 arrests within a week of the coup and as of January 2018, 
30 decrees have been issued by the government leading to the dismissal of more than 150,000 
public servant, closure of 3,000 schools, and prosecution of almost 5,000 judges70. As a result of 
these actions, both the overall score and subcategories of political rights (dropped to 4) and civil 
liberties (dropped to a 5) reached unprecedented levels71. In November of 2016, the voice of EU 
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citizens, the European Parliament voted to suspend all accession negotiations with Turkey72. 
Although the vote did not suspend accession, the European Parliament does have the power to 
influence enlargement as accession treaties must be approved by the European Parliament with 
absolute majority. The European Parliament has never rejected an accession treaty thus far; 
however, hypothetically, if Turkey progressed far enough to finalize an accession treaty the 
European Parliament has the power to block EU membership73.  
 2017 marked the largest departure of Turkey yet as they officially transitioned to a “not 
free” country through their decline in freedom rating from 4.5 to 5.5 as a result of the 2017 
constitutional reform74. This reform centralized power further in the power of Erdogan as 
president by transferring power away from local leaders and continued to remove his opponents 
from government positions. Erdogan even called Germany reminiscent of its fascist and 
declaring that “a battle has started between the cross and the half moon” days after Merkel 
stopped rallies in Germany ahead of the April 2017 Turkish referendum due to the large Turkish 
population in Germany75. The April 2017 referendum was successful (despite accusations of 
voter fraud due to the close marginal win of 51%) for Erdogan as citizens voted to shift from a 
parliamentary to presidential political system which further consolidated Erdogan’s power76. 
Angela Merkel retaliated for these actions in September of 2017 when she declared that she 
would seek to end Turkey’s membership talks, in an apparent shift of position during a televised 
debate weeks before a German election77. Some now say that we are past the point of no return 
and in April 2017, the European Parliament called for the formal suspension of Turkey’s 
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membership bid with support from the Council. Even the Council of Europe, which Turkey is a 
member of, has shown its disdain for this democratic backsliding by voting to reopen monitoring 
of Turkey. This is a signal of embarrassment for Turkey as minoring was a prerequisite to 
become a candidate country back in 1999, signaling that even an organization that Turkey is a 
member of recognizes their democratic backsliding78. 
 Economic interdependence has been minimally affected by the decline in democracy 
within Turkey since the 2016 coup. Although inflation reached a 14 year high of almost 13% in 
2017 and Turkish lira lost 11% of its value, GDP continue to grow at 11% with the third quarter 
of 201779. In addition, although FDI from the US declined from 2017 to 2016 by €172 million 
due to fears of political instability, FDI from the EU grew by €700 million in this same period80. 
Thus, foreign investors from Turkey’s biggest trade partner, the EU, were not scared away of 
continuing to engage in economic interdependence after the coup. The EU despite intense 
criticism of Erdogan after the coup has reinitiated conversations to revamp the EU-Turkey 
customs union for the future81. In this same period, we see an increase in Turkey turning trade 
towards China and Russia thus continuing along the pattern of the previous period toward 
symmetric interdependence as Turkey diversifies its trade partners82. The significance of this is 
that although the coup of 2016 and transition to consolidated presidential system of 2017 have 
had strains on EU-Turkish accession, they have not had a great influence on decreasing trade 
interdependence between the two powers.  
Conclusion 
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 The deterioration of Turkish accession into the European Union is the fault of both 
Turkey and the European Union with each member pulling back from the relationship more at 
different time periods. After gaining candidacy status in 1999, the real push for accession 
negotiations began after the election of the AKP party under Erdogan in 2002. Through reforms 
expanding political rights and increasing trade with the European Union, Turkey was rewarded 
in 2005 when the EU deemed it ready to begin opening chapters and earned an increase in 
Freedom House scores. Throughout the history of EU accession, meritocracy has proved an 
obstacle to EU accession from specific member states mainly from France, Germany, and 
Cyprus causing a halting of chapters. Economic interdependence temporarily declined as a result 
of the crisis in 2008, but trade quickly revived after the crisis, although first signs of illiberal 
actions began to be shown in Turkey through constitutional referendums. From 2012 to 2016, 
Freedom House scores declined from “partly free” to “not free” through purges, reduction of the 
powers of the courts, and hitting a boiling point in the July 2016 coup attempt. At this same time, 
Turkey moved from asymmetric towards more symmetric interdependence with the EU as it 
expanded exports away from the EU and towards other powers such as China and Russia and 
overall decreasing the level of imports from abroad. The European Union’s leverage to threaten 
to delay or halt accession has decreased as Turkey has become a more powerful economic actor. 
Thus Turkish accession has mirrored a Michael Jackson style moonwalk, constantly moving 
backwards, but switching which foot or country is taking the actions to pull accession 
backwards.  
What if the future of EU-Turkish relations?  
 What does the sui generis case of Turkey teach us about future prospects for EU 
membership? The more illiberal the candidate country became, the more meritocracy the 





accession, Turkey was quick to alter policy to get back into the good graces of the EU and 
accession negotiations such as in the 1980s. So how has Turkey changed? Economic 
interdependence between Turkey and the EU is still important; however, Turkey’s is not the 
same country it was when it joined the Customs Union or became an EU candidate. GDP of 
Tukey has increased fivefold just since the election of Erdogan in 2002 and by more than 80 
times since first applying in the 1960s83. In addition, recent policies of Erdogan have seen new 
friendless towards other illiberal powers such as Russia and China.  
 Turkey continuing to pursue illiberal democratic actions despite EU threats to cut off 
accession well turning trade away from the EU and towards other partners, would suggest that 
the Turkey has become less interested or at least fed up with waiting for EU membership. 
However, in February of 2018 President Erdogan visited EU leaders in Italy and France and 
declared that, “We want full membership. Other options are not satisfactory”84. What can explain 
this recent revival of desire for EU membership on behalf of Erdogan? Throughout this study, we 
have seen increased emphasis on the side of Erdogan towards positive EU discourse during his 
political campaigning. Some have argued that AKP uses supporting EU accession as a scapegoat 
to escape the suspicious activity of its Islamist agenda within the domestic and international 
atmospheres85. Thus some theorists like Börzel and Soyaltin believe that, “domestic change in 
Turkey is less driven by EU and its fading conditionality, but by the political agenda of the 
Turkish ruling elites and their preference for consolidating their political power”86. The next 
Turkish elections are set for November 2019 for both President and the National Assembly; thus, 
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we predict that Erdogan will continue to push a positive EU discourse while he remains on the 
campaign trail if he believes it will help him to continue to consolidate power within Turkey.  
 There are three possible paths for the future of EU-Turkish relationships. The first option 
would be convergence (EU accepting Turkish accession), competition (Turkey continues to turn 
towards other trade partners and accession completely comes to a halt), and cooperation (Turkey 
and EU work together but through a privileged partnership and give up on accession)87. An 
example of this “privileged partnership” rather than full EU membership may include the 
revamped Customs Union. We predict that if Turkey continues to grow economically and slide 
further to illiberal democracy, the competition scenario will be the most likely and accession will 
slide fully from delay to a full halt as EU leverage continues to dissipate.  
Limitations  
 This paper attempted to study the deterioration of Turkish accession by focusing on 
democratic standing and level of interdependence between Turkey and the EU. Future research 
could expand on different definitions of democracy beyond using Freedom House scores. In 
addition, there could be many ways to measure interdependence to include goods and services, 
FDI, international organization interdependence that are beyond the scope of this paper. In 
addition, this paper may have lessons for future enlargement, but many of its key findings are 
limited to Turkey as a candidate country. The EU has shown great excitement for the Wester 
Balkan countries joining by 2025 and although they are far from ready, they have not 
experienced democratic backsliding like Turkey has either. Some additional factors that was 
beyond the scope of this paper was to dive into the correlation between deterioration of Turkish 
EU accession and its connection with Turkey’s role in NATO. In addition, this analysis did not 
dive deep into the Cyprus settlement issue with Turkey, but could be further elaborated in how 
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this has had consequences on EU accession at given time periods. Future research could also 
include the analysis on the role of civil society within Turkey and how they have pursued the 
continuance of Turkish accession to the EU. Lastly, an interesting elaboration on this study 
would be to see if the deterioration of Turkish accession has coincided with declining US-
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